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F 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     ixating on what amount of human control is required in the employment 
of autonomous weapons, including autonomous cyber capabilities, errone-
ously disregards the most important question with respect to autonomy in 
armed conflict. The question is whether autonomous weapons can “select” 
and “attack” targets in a manner that complies with the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC).1 Some argue that to comply with the LOAC, selecting and targeting 
requires human judgment. There is no consensus on that assertion. Indeed, 
States that are Parties to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention 
(CCW) have not acknowledged that human involvement in selecting and en-
gaging targets is required under the LOAC.2 Rather, the views of States vary 
widely on this issue, precluding the assertion that there is a current prohibi-
tion.  
This article analyzes the specific LOAC rules on precautions in attack, as 
codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) and asserts that these 
rules do not require human judgment in targeting decisions. Rather, these 
rules prescribe a particular analysis that must be completed. That analysis is 
one, which, in the future, may be done just as effectively (if not more effec-
tively) by weapons systems using autonomous functions. 
Part II of this article briefly discusses what “autonomy” means and high-
lights that there is no single agreed-upon definition. For the purposes of this 
                                                                                                                      
1. For purposes of this article, I will use LOAC and IHL interchangeably, though I 
recognize that some may argue that they are different in both content and approach to 
regulation during armed conflict. 
2. One example is the Israeli Harpy NG. According to Shelby Smith, 
One example of an autonomous weapon system is the loitering munition. Loitering muni-
tions, which hover over a human-designated area and strike at targets that match specific 
parameters, are currently only employed in Israel. The Harpy NG, the most commonly used 
and advanced model manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries, is designed to attack 
enemy radar systems. These loitering munitions resemble drones, or UAVs, and can stay in 
the air for up to nine hours. Because loitering munitions are set up with specific limits to 
their range, they may offer a model for future development of autonomous weapons that 
afford an element of control without the need for human monitoring. 
Shelby Smith, Automated Defense Technology, 3 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
492, 499 (2019). Other systems include the Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) and 
the Phalanx. See Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) Intercept Land-Based Phalanx Weapon 
System (LPWS), U.S. ARMY, https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/ms-c-ram_lpws/ 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2020); Phalanx Weapon System, RAYTHEON MISSILES AND DEFENSE, 
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/phalanx-close-in-
weapon-system (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
 
 
 
Autonomy and Precautions in the Law of Armed Conflict Vol. 96 
579 
 
 
 
 
 
article, the key aspect of autonomy is that a weapon system can select and 
attack targets without human intervention. Part III analyzes the argument 
that human judgment is required for selecting and attacking targets and con-
trasts that position against the current practice of States and their statements 
on the issue. Further, this Part looks specifically at the requirement to take 
precautions, as codified in Article 57 of AP I. Part IV concludes finding that 
no requirement for human judgment in selecting and attacking targets cur-
rently exists. 
 
II. AUTONOMY 
 
Autonomy, in particular the use of autonomy in weapons systems, is a major 
point of discussion between States. As Masahiro Kurosaki writes, “[A]uton-
omy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts that will be 
fought and won with technology.”3 Many of these unmanned systems will 
be either assisted by or based almost completely on cyber capabilities. 
Within the last ten years, formal discussions on autonomous weapons, 
or weapons that rely on autonomous functions such as machine learning or 
artificial intelligence, have failed to produce a common understanding of 
what “autonomy” even means.4 As Chris Jenks notes, “the international 
community cannot even agree about what they disagree about.”5 
To some degree, the position individuals or States take on autonomous 
weapons may be influenced by the definitional decision on autonomy. For 
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines au-
tonomous weapon systems as “weapon systems with autonomy in their ‘crit-
ical functions’ of selecting and attacking targets.”6 Further, the organization 
                                                                                                                      
3. Masahiro Kurosaki, Towards the Special Computer Law of Targeting: 'Fully Autonomous' 
Weapons Systems and the Proportionality Test, in NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW (Claus Kreß & Robert Lawless eds., forthcoming 
2020). 
4. Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral Panic, and Conceptual Cul-De-Sacs: Critiquing & Re-
framing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 44 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 1, 13 (2016). 
5. Id.; see also Heather M. Roff & Richard Moyes, Meaningful Human Control, Artificial 
Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons: Briefing Paper for Delegates at the Convention on Certain Con-
ventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)), at 
1, 2016, http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FI-
NAL.pdf. 
6. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CONFLICT: A HUMAN-CENTRED APPROACH 1, 2 (2019), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/96992/ai_and_machine_learning_in_armed_conflict-
icrc.pdf [hereinafter ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING]. 
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takes the approach that such systems “are an immediate concern from a hu-
manitarian, legal and ethical perspective, given the risk of loss of human con-
trol over weapons and the use of force.”7 
By contrast, the United Kingdom approaches autonomy more broadly, 
stating, “[f]ocusing solely on specific – or ‘critical’ – functions or activity in 
the lifecycle of a weapon is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure there is human 
control.”8 The United Kingdom  argues that basing regulation on the char-
acterization of a system’s function is unhelpful. Instead, it asserts that “it is 
the cumulative effect of multiple safeguards across the development and op-
erational lifecycle that establish human control of weapon systems. There-
fore, human control should be considered and exercised throughout this 
lifecycle and in a way that is appropriate to the operational context.”9 
Such disparate views cause legal experts like Chris Jenks and Rain Liivoja 
to conclude that “autonomy is better thought of across several different 
spectrums.”10 They further add that “attempts at overall system categoriza-
tion based on only one of the spectrums—machine complexity—lack prac-
tical utility.”11 
For the purposes of this article, a weapon system is autonomous “when 
it possesses both an intent (an encoded representation of a goal, a purpose, 
or a task to be completed) and the ability to act within its environment in 
furtherance of that goal.”12 Under this definition, autonomous weapons sys-
tems, including autonomous cyber capabilities, could be subject to human 
control, but also may function without constant, or even decisive, human 
control, including during the processes of selecting and engaging targets. 
                                                                                                                      
7. Id. 
8. U.K. Mission Geneva, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of 
Government Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weap-
ons Systems, Agenda Item 5(d): Further Consideration of the Human Element in the Use 
of Lethal Force; Aspects of Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment 
and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 
at  1, Mar. 25–29, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/85A4A 
A89AFCFD316C12583D3003EAB3E/$file/20190318-5(d)_HMI_Statement.pdf [herein-
after U.K. Statement]. 
9. Id. at 2. 
10. Chris Jenks & Rain Liivoja, Machine Autonomy and the Constant Care Obligation, HU-
MANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Dec. 11, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/ 
2018/12/11/machine-autonomy-constant-care-obligation/. 
11. Id. 
12. TIM MCFARLAND, THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY’ IN AUTONOMOUS CYBER CA-
PABILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rain Liivoja & Ann Väljataga eds., forthcoming 
2021). 
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Weapons and weapons systems that are autonomous in this sense have 
raised the ire of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
ICRC, and have become the basis for much of the debate among States—
particularly in the meetings of States Party to the CCW. Some scholars have 
argued that the CCW is the perfect forum to hear these debates and to reg-
ulate autonomous weapons.13 Part III will analyze these discussions. 
One additional definitional caveat is important. The consideration here 
of autonomous weapons systems is distinct from the question of weapons 
that may in the future utilize artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence in-
cludes cognition.14 While an autonomous weapons system does not neces-
sarily require cognition to “learn” on the battlefield, this article considers 
weapons systems that use artificial intelligence or machine learning to adjust 
decision-making processes, but not weapons systems that are cognitive. 
 
                                                                                                                      
13. Qiang Li & Dan Xie, Legal Regulation of AI Weapons under International Humanitarian 
Law: A Chinese Perspective, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (May 2, 2019), https://blogs. 
icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/05/02/ai-weapon-ihl-legal-regulation-chinese-perspective/. 
Li and Xie argue: 
Moreover, the targeting of AI weapon systems is closely tied to their design and program-
ming. The more autonomy they have, the higher the design and programming standards 
must be in order to meet the IHL requirements. For this purpose, the international com-
munity is encouraged to adopt a new convention specific to AI weapons, such as the Con-
vention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocols, or the Convention against Anti-per-
sonnel Mines and Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
14. As Dustin Lewis writes: 
AI science pertains in part to the development of computationally based understandings of 
intelligent behavior, typically through two interrelated steps. One of those steps concerns 
the determination of cognitive structures and processes and the corresponding design of 
ways to represent and reason effectively. The other step relates to the development of the-
ories, models, data, equations, algorithms and/or systems that embody that understanding. 
So defined, AI systems are typically conceived as incorporating techniques—and leading to 
the development of tools—that enable systems to ‘reason’ more or less ‘intelligently’ and to 
‘act’ more or less ‘autonomously’. The systems might do so by, for example, interpreting 
natural languages and visual scenes; ‘learning’ (or, perhaps more commonly, training); draw-
ing inferences; and making ‘decisions’ and taking action on those ‘decisions’. The techniques 
and tools might be rooted in one or more of the following methods: those rooted in logical 
reasoning broadly conceived, which are sometimes also referred to as ‘symbolic AI’ (as a form 
of model-based methods); those rooted in probability (also as a form of model-based meth-
ods); and/or those rooted in statistical reasoning and data (as a form of data-dependent or data-
driven methods). 
Dustin A. Lewis, Legal Reviews of Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare Involving Artificial In-
telligence: 16 Elements to Consider, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/03/21/legal-reviews-weapons-means-meth-
ods-warfare-artificial-intelligence-16-elements-consider/. 
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III. HUMAN JUDGMENT AND PRECAUTIONS 
 
I argue more in-depth elsewhere that the LOAC does not require weapons 
that utilize machine learning or artificial intelligence to be limited by some 
inclusion of human judgment in the processes of selecting and engaging tar-
gets.15 I will briefly restate various views on this question to facilitate a dis-
cussion of how weapons that use machine learning and artificial intelligence, 
including cyber weapons, might be governed by the LOAC, including the 
rules on precautions. 
Initially, it is important to confirm that the LOAC applies to the use of 
emerging technologies in general and to autonomous weapons systems or 
weapons that use machine learning and artificial intelligence in particular. 
This view is shared both by States16 and by NGOs.17 However, great debate 
exists as to how those weapons systems might comply with the LOAC. 
In the past decade, various organizations have argued that any use of 
autonomous weapons would be unlawful because of the non-human element 
                                                                                                                      
15. Eric Talbot Jensen, The (Erroneous) Requirement for Human Judgment (and Error) in the 
Law of Armed Conflict, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 26 (2020). 
16. See, e.g., Brazil, GGE on LAWS – 2019 1st Week, Challenges to IHL – Item 5(a), 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/122DF2DAEE334DDBC125
83CC003EFD6F/$file/Brazil+GGE+LAWS+2019+-+Item+5+a+-+IHL.pdf; Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, Statement of the Netherlands Delivered by Mr. Reint Vogelaar, First 
Secretary, Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Conference 
on Disarmament at Group of Experts on LAWS, Agenda Item 5(a): An Exploration of the 
Potential Challenges Posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems to International Humanitarian Law, Apr. 26, 2019, https://www.unog. 
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A2E0497EE93C232AC12583CB0037813B/$file/
5a+NL+Statement+Legal+Challenges-final.pdf; Poland, 4th GGE on LAWS, Statement of 
the Delegation of Poland: General Comments, Mar. 25, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/ 
80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5CAD5A1367E305A5C12583CC004CA205/$file/1.
+GGE_LAWS_March+2019_PL+Statement_General+comments_25.03.2019.pdf; Euro-
pean Union, EU Statement, Group of Governmental Experts, Lethal Autonomous Weap-
ons Systems, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Mar. 25–29, 2019, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/EA84B3C2340F877DC12583
CB003727F3/$file/ALIGNED+-+LAWS+GGE+EU+statement+IHL.pdf. 
17. See, e.g., Netta Goussac, Safety Net or Tangled Web: Legal Reviews of AI in Weapons and 
War-Fighting, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Apr. 18, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/ 
law-and-policy/2019/04/18/safety-net-tangled-web-legal-reviews-ai-weapons-war-fighting 
(stating that “all weapons used in war must be used, and be capable of being used, in com-
pliance with IHL” and that “each State that develops or acquires weapons that utilize AI 
must be satisfied that these weapons can be used in compliance with existing rules of war-
fare.”); see also CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
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and have called for a ban on research and development of these weapons.18 
The ICRC, while acknowledging the key role of States in this discussion,19 
takes the following view: 
 
These rules require context-specific judgements to be taken by those who 
plan, decide upon and carry out attacks to ensure: distinction – between 
military objectives, which may law-fully be attacked, and civilians or civilian 
objects, which must not be attacked; proportionality – in terms of ensuring 
that the incidental civilian harm expected from an attack will not be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; 
and to enable precautions in attack – so that risks to civilians can be further 
minimized. 
 
Where AI systems are used in attacks – whether as part of physical or 
cyber-weapon systems, or in decision-support systems – their design and 
use must enable combatants to make these judgements.20 
 
In response to this argument, Masahiro Kurosaki counters that “[T]he exist-
ing human-centered paradigm is merely a product of the history of LOAC 
and does not exist a priori, an alternative approach to adjust to changing 
times, should be explored.”21 
States have taken widely disparate views on these questions. For exam-
ple, in response to the call for a ban on autonomous weapons systems, the 
United Kingdom argues: 
 
[I]n the absence of any clearly articulated empirical evidence as to why ex-
isting regulation—including IHL—is inadequate to control developments 
in emerging technologies, the issue may well lie not with the processes 
themselves, but with the perceived ability of machines to assimilate, under-
stand and meet the relevant extant legal and ethical standards.22 
                                                                                                                      
18. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, supra note 17. 
19. ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING, supra note 6, at 2. 
20. Id. at 7–8. 
21. Kurosaki, supra note 3. 
22. U.K. Statement, supra note 8. The United Kingdom also asserts: 
[W]eapons systems that cannot meet these standards will remain incapable of legal use as 
set out in existing national and international normative frameworks and will not be devel-
oped, fielded and used. All states should look to ensure they meet the basic obligations 
already set out in the relevant articles of IHL before pressing for bespoke legislation for as-
yet undefined capabilities. 
UK Mission Geneva, Statement regarding Agenda Item 5(a) at Meeting of Group of Gov-
ernmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
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Greece23 and Germany24 support the view that the LOAC requires a de-
gree of human control in selecting and engaging targets, but as Rebecca 
Crootof notes there is little clarity on the specifics of that control.25 As an 
example of the differing views on how human control might manifest in an 
autonomous weapon system, the United Kingdom states: 
 
[D]irect human involvement in every detailed action of a system or plat-
form may not be practical or desirable under all circumstances. Instead a 
human-centred approach to autonomous technologies must take into ac-
count the operational context as well as the capabilities and limitations of 
the personnel deploying the weapon system.26 
 
This operational context might include considerations such as whether the 
system is a land, air or sea-based system and the specific circumstances of 
both the development and the deployment of the system.27 
                                                                                                                      
Systems 3, Mar. 25–29, 2019,  https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/ 
1ED3972D40AE53B5C12583D3003F8E5E/$file/20190318-5(a)_IHL_Statement.pdf. 
23. Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations and the Other International 
Organizations Geneva, Statement by Greece, Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Potential Challenges Posed by Emerging Tech-
nologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems to International Humanitar-
ian Law, at 1, Mar. 25–29, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http As-
sets)/D1B935800DF5F04DC12583CC002F3DD1/$file/GGE+LAWS+STATEMENT+ 
by+GREECE-+Challenges+to+IHL.pdf. 
24. Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany, Group of Governmental Experts on 
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Statement by Germany – On Agenda Item 5(b) Further Consideration of the Human Ele-
ment in the Use of Lethal Force; Aspects of Human Machine Interaction in the Develop-
ment, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http As-
sets)/2B8E772610C0F552C12583CB003A4192/$file/20190326+Statement3+Germany+ 
GGE+LAWS.pdf. 
25. Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for “Meaningful Human Control,” 30 TEMPLE IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 53, 54 (2016). 
26. U.K. Statement, supra note 8. 
27. Id. 
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In 2019, U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel Paul Ney argued 
that autonomy makes and will continue to make weapons systems more ac-
curate, more precise, and able to perform much more quickly.28 In perhaps 
the strongest statement against the fixation on human control, Ney stated: 
 
In the U.S. perspective, there is nothing intrinsically valuable about manu-
ally operating a weapon system as opposed to operating it with an autono-
mous function. For example, existing law of war treaties do not seek to 
enhance “human control” as such. Rather, these treaties seek, among other 
things, to ensure the use of weapons consistent with the fundamental prin-
ciples of distinction and proportionality, and with the obligation to take 
feasible precautions for the protection of the civilian population. Although 
“human control” can be a useful means in implementing these principles, 
“human control” as such is not, and should not be, an end in itself. In our 
view, we should not be developing novel principles that stigmatize the use 
of emerging technologies, when these technologies could significantly en-
hance how the existing principles of the law of war are implemented in 
military operations.29 
 
Two points appear clear from this brief review of State perspectives. First, 
all autonomous weapons systems developed and employed must comply 
with the LOAC. Second, there is no consensus as to the degree of human 
control necessary to comply with the LOAC. 
Echoing Ney’s statement above, the focus of international regulation 
should be on LOAC compliance, and not on who or what is bringing about 
that compliance. As I conclude elsewhere: 
 
[T]he legal standard for weapon systems using machine learning and artifi-
cial intelligence should be the “best application possible” rather than the 
“best application humanly possible.” International focus on the decisions 
                                                                                                                      
28. See Paul C. Ney Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Keynote Ad-
dress at the Israel Defense Forces 3rd International Conference on the Law of Armed Con-
flict (May 28, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-department-general-counsel-
remarks-idf-conference [hereinafter Ney Address]. 
29. Id. For additional statements by the United States in the context of the CCW dis-
cussions, see Group of Government Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Hu-
man-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technol-
ogies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2 (2018), U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4 (2018). 
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of warfare, rather than the decisionmakers, will benefit all concerned and 
result in greater protections for the participants in and the victims of armed 
conflict.30 
 
With that foundation, a more specific analysis of precautions in attack, 
as codified in Article 57 of AP I, is in order to determine key focus areas in 
ensuring compliance with the LOAC—particularly by militaries that develop 
and employ autonomous systems to select and engage targets. 
 
A. Article 57(1) – “Constant Care” 
 
Although Article 57(1) falls under the heading of “Precautions in Attack,” 
its broad coverage includes the conduct of “military operations” generally.31 
The obligation on States is one of “constant care.”32 Autonomous systems 
have already been created to take an active role in non-combat military op-
erations (for example, logistics).33 Although this article focuses on the use of 
autonomy in combat situations, non-combat autonomous systems can also 
cause death or injury and therefore deserve some comment here. 
Jenks and Liivoja address the issue of autonomy with non-combat vehi-
cles. They argue: 
 
Article 57(1) would require that autonomous vehicles be designed and re-
lied upon with the safety of the civilian population in mind. Thus, an au-
tonomous ground vehicle should avoid, for example, injuring civilians or 
damaging civilian building[s] and infrastructure. Likewise, an autonomous 
aerial vehicle should be capable of avoiding civilian air traffic and not crash 
                                                                                                                      
30. Jensen, supra note 15, at 57. 
31. The Commentary to AP I states: “The term ‘military operations’ should be under-
stood to mean any movements, manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by 
the armed forces with a view to combat.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 2191 (Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter AP I] (“In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”). 
33. Jon Harper, Autonomous Helicopters Seen as Wave of the Future, NATIONAL DEFENSE 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/2/ 
20/autonomous-helicopters-seen-as-wave-of-the-future. 
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into and damage civilian objects upon a failure of the communication link 
to its operator.34 
 
This quote highlights the fact that non-combat autonomous systems may 
still lead to death or injury and thus commanders need to employ them with 
constant care for the civilian population. 
The constant care obligation applies equally to autonomous cyber oper-
ations. As I write elsewhere, “commanders and all persons conducting cyber 
operations must recognize and accept the legal obligation to exercise con-
stant care in all military operations, including cyber operations.”35 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 also takes this position, stating, “During hostilities 
involving cyber operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, individual civilians, and civilian objects.”36 The Group of Ex-
perts was unanimous in the formulation of this rule and argued: 
 
Use of the word ‘constant’ denotes that the duty to take care to protect 
civilians and civilian objects is of a continuing nature throughout cyber op-
erations; all those involved in the operation must discharge the duty. The 
law admits of no situation in which, or time when, individuals involved in 
the planning and execution process may ignore the effects of their opera-
tions on civilians or civilian objects. In the cyber context, this requires sit-
uational awareness at all times, not merely during the preparatory stage of 
an operation.37 
 
The “constant” nature of this requirement applies equally to autonomous 
cyber systems. In designing and utilizing such systems, even outside the con-
text of an attack, military operators must ensure that the autonomous system 
can exercise constant care. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
34. Jenks & Liivoja, supra note 10. 
35. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 89 INTER-
NATIONAL LAW STUDIES 198, 204 (2013). 
36. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE r. 114, at 476 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
Note that the author was a member of the Group of Experts for both Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013) and Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations.  
37. Id. at 477 (citations omitted). 
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B. Article 57(2) – “Precautions in Attack” 
 
Article 57(2) codifies the current customary law on applying “precautions in 
attack.” These provisions are among those recognized as binding on all 
States that desire to utilize weapons—whether autonomous or not. The 
question raised by autonomous weapons systems is whether these systems 
can comply with the requirements stated in Article 57. Professor Suresh Ven-
katasubramanian perhaps best describes this question: 
 
If we look at the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions 
under international humanitarian law as guidance for when an attack is con-
sidered permissible, we see a lot of judgement framed in terms that to a 
computer scientist seem imprecise. One might argue that the vagueness in 
these terms is by design: it allows for nuance and context as well as human 
expert judgement to play in a role in a decision, much like how the discre-
tion of a judge plays a role in judging the severity of a sentence. Another 
view of this ‘vagueness by design’ is that it allows for future contestability: if 
commanders are forced to defend a decision later on, they can do so by 
appealing to their own experience and judgement in interpreting a situation. 
. . . But what of algorithm-driven targeting? How is a system supposed to 
learn what targets satisfy principles of proportionality, distinction and pre-
caution when to do so it must rely on a precise labeling that almost cannot 
exist by design.38 
 
Accordingly, this section will analyze the legal requirements contained in the 
subsections of Article 57(2) and (3) and argue that despite potential techno-
logical and conceptual limitations, none of those subsections present an in-
surmountable legal obstacle to the use of autonomous weapons systems. 
 
1. “Those Who Plan or Decide upon an Attack” 
 
Beginning with Article 57(2), the first provision bearing on the use of auton-
omous weapons systems, including weapons with autonomous cyber capa-
bility, is subparagraph (a). That subparagraph specifically regulates those 
who plan or decide upon an attack. The ICRC takes the following view:  
 
                                                                                                                      
38. Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Structural Disconnects between Algorithmic Decision-Making 
and the Law, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Apr. 25, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-
and-policy/2019/04/25/structural-disconnects-algorithmic-decision-making-law/. 
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International humanitarian law (IHL) requires that those who plan, decide 
upon and carry out attacks make certain judgements in applying the norms 
when launching an attack. Ethical considerations parallel this requirement 
– demanding that human agency and intention be retained in decisions to 
use force.39 
 
Although it is not clear from the text of this provision that human judg-
ment is required, the ICRC argues that both legal and ethical considerations 
require human judgment. Others take the same approach, arguing specifi-
cally that this provision establishes an accountability mechanism that pre-
cludes autonomous systems. For example, Roff and Moyes describe ac-
countability as follows: 
 
[A]n ex post process to locate responsibility or liability with human agents, 
. . . [that] also establishes a framework of expectation that can guide human 
agents to align their behavior with expected and appropriate standards. 
Standards for accountability, moreover, need to ensure that responsibility 
and liability will be apportioned equitably, and that sanctions will be applied 
that are commensurate with the wrongdoing (whether intentional or inad-
vertent) and with the severity of harm that may have been caused.40 
 
As inferred above, some complain that autonomous weapons systems that 
select and engage targets leave no method of accountability for decisions that 
violate the LOAC. Others counter that accountability is not, and has not 
been, focused solely on the person pulling the trigger, which, in the case of 
                                                                                                                      
39. International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement of the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Group 
of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Apr. 9–13, 2018, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B718A7D561773A68C12583B
B003AF8A5/$file/CCW+GGE+April+2018+-+ICRC+general+debate.pdf. The ICRC 
also asserts: 
[E]thical considerations very much parallel the requirement for a minimum level of human 
control over weapon systems and the use of force . . . . From an ethical viewpoint, “mean-
ingful”, “effective” or “appropriate” human control would be the type and degree of control 
that preserves human agency and upholds moral responsibility in decisions to use force. 
This . . . requires a sufficiently direct and close connection to be maintained between the 
human intent of the user and the eventual consequences of the operation of the weapon 
system in a specific attack. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS: AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN CONTROL? 22 (2018), https://www.icrc.org/ 
en/download/file/69961/icrc_ethics_and_autonomous_weapon_systems_report_3_april 
_2018.pdf. 
40. Roff & Moyes, supra note 5, at 3. 
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autonomous weapons systems, would mean the system itself.41 The language 
of those who “plan or decide” is obviously meant to include not just the 
trigger puller, but also those at all levels of command and decisionmaking. 
This would include, in particular, those who order autonomous weapons 
systems into battle. As shown below, the Commentary and the statements of 
the delegations to the negotiating conference that led to AP I confirm this 
understanding. 
The phrase “plan or decide” was a topic of discussion at the AP I nego-
tiating conference. As the 1987 Commentary on the Additional Protocols states: 
 
The terminology used in this provision led to some criticism and explana-
tory statements. Some considered that the introductory words (“those who 
plan or decide upon an attack”) could lay a heavy burden of responsibility 
on subordinate officers who are not always capable of taking such deci-
sions, which should really fall upon higher ranking officers. This view is 
not without grounds, but it is clear that a very large majority of delegations 
at the Diplomatic Conference wished to cover all situations with a single 
provision, including those which may arise during close combat where 
commanding officers, even those of subordinate rank, may have to take 
very serious decisions regarding the fate of the civilian population and ci-
vilian objects. It clearly follows that the high command of an army has the 
duty to instruct personnel adequately so that the latter, even if of low rank, 
can act correctly in the situations envisaged.42 
 
Many statements made by the delegations at the conference support this 
view. For example, the Swiss delegation stated that it “was critical of para-
graphs 2 and 3 of Article 50 because they lacked clarity; particularly the words 
‘Those who plan or decide upon an attack . . . ’ in paragraph 2 (a).”43 Others, 
                                                                                                                      
41. See, e.g., Merel Ekelhof, Autonomous Weapons: Operationalizing Meaningful Human Con-
trol, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Aug. 15, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/08/15/autonomous-weapons-operationalizing-meaningful-human-control/. 
42. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, ¶ 2197. 
43. 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS 212, ¶ 43 (1978). Further, the delegation concluded, 
That ambiguous wording might well place a burden or responsibility on junior military per-
sonnel which ought normally to be borne by those of higher rank. The obligations set out 
in Article 50 could concern the high commands only - the higher grades of the military 
hierarchy, and it was thus that Switzerland would interpret that provision. 
Id. 
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including delegations from Afghanistan,44 Austria,45 the Netherlands,46 and 
Sweden47 echoed this statement. 
Contemporary commentators express the same concerns. For example, 
Rebecca Crootof, in speaking about the command levels at which human 
control should be exercised, writes: 
 
[T]here is still no agreement as to the level of decision-making at which 
human control must occur. The commander determining the rules of en-
gagement is exercising a certain kind of control, the commander ordering 
a particular attack is exercising another, and the individual implementing 
that order might exercise yet another kind of control. 
 
Given the difficulty in pinning down what “meaningful human control” 
actually requires, “[s]everal states [have] expressed skepticism over the 
added value of the suggested concept, assessing it as being too vague, sub-
jective and unclear.”48 
 
Moreover, Roff and Moyes argue: 
 
At its most basic level, the requirement for [meaningful human control] 
develops from two premises: 1. That a machine applying force and operat-
ing without any human control whatsoever is broadly considered unac-
ceptable. 2. That a human simply pressing a ‘fire’ button in response to 
indications from a computer, without cognitive clarity or awareness, is not 
sufficient to be considered ‘human control’ in a substantive sense.49 
 
In responding to the second point raised by Roff and Moyes, Merel Ekelhof 
poses an interesting scenario in which a fighter pilot is sent on an attack 
mission to deliver ordnance  on an enemy position. As is normal in military 
operations, a targeting cell, which includes a lawyer, reviewed the target prior 
to its approval. The pilot is then assigned the mission, briefed on the intelli-
gence situation, and given specific details about the target—all of which is 
also loaded into the aircraft’s targeting systems. In this particular example, 
poor weather prevents the pilot from having good visibility of the target. 
                                                                                                                      
44. Id. at 219. 
45. Id. at 212, ¶ 46. 
46. Id. at 205, ¶ 1. 
47. Id. at 236–37. 
48. Crootof, supra note 25, at 58 (citations omitted). 
49. Roff & Moyes, supra note 5, at 1 (citation omitted). 
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Ekelhof argues that in such circumstances, the pilot will have to “rely on the 
aircraft’s systems, the weapons guidance systems, and the validation proce-
dure at the operational level to ensure s/he is striking a legitimate military 
objective in a lawful manner.”50 Accordingly, she continues: 
 
Thus, the information about the lawfulness of the action largely depends 
on the operator’s trust in his or her superiors in the chain of command (to 
provide proper briefing materials and conduct target validation during the 
planning phase), the F-16 board computer (suggesting the appropriate time 
for weapon’s release) and the weapon’s guidance system (navigating the 
munitions to the target). At no point during our F2T2EA process will the 
pilot gather intelligence about the target or conduct legal analyses.51 
 
Ekelhof’s scenario aptly illustrates the point that the deliverer of the ord-
nance—the individual attacking—is doing so having neither seen the target, 
nor verified the intelligence. Such attacks take place all the time in modern 
warfare. Similar scenarios can be described with respect to artillery and most 
“beyond the line of sight” weapons. 
After analyzing this common scenario, Ekelhof concludes: 
 
the concept of meaningful human control is not the only, or perhaps the 
most fitting, approach to analyzing (the effect of autonomous technologies 
on) human control over critical targeting decisions. Instead, the more ap-
propriate analytical lens would be one that recognizes the distributed na-
ture of control in military decision-making in order to pay due regard to a 
practice that has shaped operations over the past decades and continues to 
be standard in contemporary targeting.52 
 
Ekelhof’s scenario and her conclusions highlight the importance of the lan-
guage in Article 57, which places responsibility for ensuring precautions not 
only with the “trigger puller,” but also with many others in the military deci-
sion-making process. This would, of course, also apply to commanders who 
employ autonomous weapons systems, including cyber systems. 
Arguing that autonomous weapons systems cannot be utilized in con-
formity with the LOAC because they lack an accountability mechanism is an 
overly narrow reading of the words in Article 57. The responsibility falls not 
only to those who execute the attacks (including an autonomous weapons 
                                                                                                                      
50. Ekelhof, supra note 41. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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system), but also to those in “higher commands” such as the local, opera-
tional, and strategic military commanders who will employ those weapons 
systems on the battlefield, and those in the research, production, review, and 
approval processes. A more holistic understanding of “those who plan or 
decide upon an attack” leaves no accountability gap. 
This analysis applies equally to weapons utilizing autonomous cyber ca-
pabilities. In the commentary discussing Rule 115,53 Tallinn Manual 2.0 states: 
 
An important feature of Rule 115 is its focus on planners and decision-
makers. Those who execute cyber attacks may sometimes also be the ones 
who approve them. In the case of certain attacks, the individual actually 
executing the attack has the capability to determine the nature of the target 
and to cancel the operation . . . On other occasions, the person executing 
the attack may not be privy to information as to its character or even the 
identity of the target. He or she may simply be carrying out instructions to 
deliver the cyber weapon against a predetermined part of the cyber infra-
structure. Under these circumstances, the duty of the individual carrying 
out the cyber attack to verify would be limited to those measures that are 
feasible in the circumstances.54 
 
Because of the technology required for cyber attacks, a combination of indi-
viduals likely designed and built the cyber tool, determined the accessibility 
of the target, mapped the “surrounding” cyber network, installed the mal-
ware, and executed the malware. Consider also the additional leaders and 
commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic level who are not cyber 
experts but will make significant decisions concerning the employment of 
cyber tools in their area of operations. To the extent that they “plan or decide 
upon” the attack, they all have the legal obligation to comply with this pre-
caution. Despite this potentially expanded field of players in a cyber attack, 
there is nothing inherent in the technology that would prevent a full and 
thorough analysis under Article 57. As Tallinn Manual 2.0 states: 
 
The limitation of this Rule to those who plan or decide upon cyber attacks 
should not be interpreted as relieving others of the obligation to take ap-
propriate steps should information come to their attention that suggests an 
                                                                                                                      
53. Rule 115 states: “Those who plan or decide upon a cyber attack shall do everything 
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects 
and are not subject to special protection.” TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 36, at 478. 
54. Id. (citation omitted). 
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intended target of a cyber attack is a protected person or object, or that the 
attack would otherwise be prohibited.55 
 
One last comment on this point is important before moving on to fur-
ther provisions of Article 57. In a recent publication, Laura Dickinson argues 
that administrative accountability can also play a key role in the lawful use of 
cyber capabilities during military operations.56 Dickinson contends that dis-
cussions about the potential of administrative accountability to regulate and 
ensure the compliance of cyber operations with the LOAC have been largely 
absent. She asserts: 
 
Such accountability includes multiple administrative procedures, inquiries, 
sanctions, and reforms that can be deployed within the military or the ad-
ministrative state more broadly to respond to an incident in which a viola-
tion of IHL/LOAC may have occurred. This form of accountability may 
be particularly useful in the case of LAWS, because the restrictions of crim-
inal law, such as the intent requirement for most crimes, may not apply in 
many circumstances. Administrative accountability is flexible both in the 
process by which it unfolds and in the remedies available, offering the pro-
spect of both individual sanctions as well as broader organizational re-
forms.57 
 
Dickinson’s argument for including administrative accountability in the re-
view process further supports an expansive view of accountability. Too nar-
row a view on accountability unnecessarily limits the application of legal 
norms to autonomy on the battlefield. 
 
2. “Do Everything Feasible to Verify” – Distinction 
 
Article 57(2)(a)(i) effectively restates the LOAC principle of distinction and 
requires those who plan or decide upon attacks to do everything feasible to 
verify that the targets are appropriate military objectives. The content of this 
rule needs no explanation here. The important question for this discussion 
is whether autonomous weapons systems can apply the principle of distinc-
tion, and how that might be assured. 
                                                                                                                      
55. Id. 
56. Laura A. Dickinson, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Overlooked Importance of 
Administrative Accountability, in THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT 69–85 (Eric Talbot Jensen & Ronald Alcala eds., 2019). 
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Distinction is often believed to be a principle that requires human judg-
ment and discretion because of the complexity of the decisions on the mod-
ern battlefield. Rather, meaningful adherence to distinction is both a techno-
logical question and a legal question. An analysis on whether autonomous 
weapons systems and those that utilize autonomous cyber capabilities are 
able to satisfactorily comply with the rules of distinction must be assessed 
through this latter framework. Moreover, whether or when technology will 
be capable of applying human judgment is beyond the scope of this paper, 
and not vital to the current discussion. Recent technological developments 
may allow the integration of biologically realistic neural networks with com-
puter hardware in a way that could create an autonomous weapon with think-
ing and processing elements.58 Such developments might significantly alter 
the discussion concerning the application of human judgment by weapons 
systems. 
However, accepting that technology is, at present, incapable of human-
like judgment, the question at hand is what legal obligation, if any, stipulates 
that an autonomous weapons system could not comply with distinction? Re-
call Ney’s 2019 remarks, which stated: 
 
In the U.S. perspective, there is nothing intrinsically valuable about manu-
ally operating a weapon system as opposed to operating it with an autono-
mous function. For example, existing law of war treaties do not seek to 
enhance “human control” as such. Rather, these treaties seek, among other 
things, to ensure the use of weapons consistent with the fundamental prin-
ciples of distinction and proportionality, and with the obligation to take 
feasible precautions for the protection of the civilian population. Although 
“human control” can be a useful means in implementing these principles, 
“human control” as such is not, and should not be, an end in itself.59 
 
Other than the assertion that humans must be involved in any decision to 
select or engage targets—an assertion that has not been accepted by the in-
ternational community as legally binding—there is no legal basis for arguing 
that autonomous systems cannot achieve compliance with the LOAC, in-
cluding the principle of distinction. 
                                                                                                                      
58. Carolyn Sharp, Status of the Operator: Biologically Inspired Computing as Both a 
Weapon and an Effector of Laws of War Compliance (on file with author). 
59. Ney Address, supra note 28. 
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With respect to cyber operations, cyber actors have used both indiscrim-
inate60 and very carefully tailored61 tools in conducting cyber operations. As 
with all autonomous weapons systems, autonomous cyber tools would have 
to be able to apply force discriminately. 
States that develop autonomous systems do not abrogate their legal duty 
to ensure that every weapons system employed by its armed forces complies 
with the LOAC. While not always strictly observed,62 States comply with this 
requirement through a weapons review process63 that has been well docu-
mented and discussed. This weapons review process includes an initial re-
view as well as any necessary follow-up reviews for weapons systems that 
might change, adapt, or “learn” on the battlefield.64 States can neither de-
velop nor employ an autonomous weapon system, whether cyber or other-
wise, that cannot apply precautions, including the principle of distinction.  
 
3. “Take All Feasible Precautions in the Choice of Means and Methods” – 
Weaponeering 
 
Article 57(2)(a)(ii) requires States to “take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any 
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects.” Accordingly, the weapons and tactics armed 
forces utilize in armed conflict, including potential autonomous weapons 
                                                                                                                      
60. Statement from the Press Secretary, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/. 
61. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-
ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html. 
62. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL RE-
VIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE 5 (2006), https://e-
brief.icrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/12-A-Guide-to-the-Legal-Review-of-New-
Weapons.pdf. 
63. AP I, supra note 32, art. 36; U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 5000.01, The 
Defense Acquisition System ¶ 1.2.v. (2003) (Incorporating Change 2, Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/500001p.pdf; 
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL § 6.2 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016).  
64. See U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 
¶ 4.c. (2012) (Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017) (requiring certain autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapons to be considered for approval in accordance with DoD Di-
rective 5000.01).  
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systems and those that utilize artificial intelligence or machine learning, must 
be capable of complying with this rule. 
Although this is a significant and necessarily burdensome requirement 
clearly affecting the research, development, and employment of weapons 
and tactics, it is important to note that these provisions equally apply to au-
tonomous weapons systems, including autonomous cyber weapons. As Rain 
Liivoja points out, most LOAC rules are “technology-neutral” or “technol-
ogy-indifferent,” meaning that they need not change with every new techno-
logical development.65 Echoing Liivoja, Marco Longobardo states: 
 
[T]he rules on the protection of civilians are the same regardless of whether 
hostilities are conducted with swords, bows, muskets, bombers, drones, or 
robots; simply, civilians must not be made the object of attacks, period. In 
this sense, most international humanitarian law rules are ‘technology-indif-
ferent’, that is, they govern ‘the conduct of hostilities and offer[] protection 
to persons not taking part in hostilities [] all quite irrespective of the means 
and methods of warfare the belligerents adopt and other technology that 
they use.66 
 
As Longobardo argues, this requirement is technology-neutral and therefore 
poses no additional limitation on the use of autonomous weapons systems, 
whether cyber or non-cyber. Any weapons review process must account for 
this provision of the law and must ensure that autonomous weapons are 
capable of applying this rule. No additional legal requirement exists. 
 
4. “Refrain from Deciding to Launch an Attack” – Proportionality 
 
Article 57(2)(a)(iii) is commonly known as the “proportionality rule.” This 
provision is explicitly clear that applying the principle of proportionality (one 
of the general protections for civilians67) is a legal requirement for all those 
who plan or decide upon attacks. 
                                                                                                                      
65. Rain Liivoja, Technological Change and the Evolution of the Law of War, 97 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1157, 1168–69 (2016). 
66. Marco Longobardo, Training and Education of Armed Forces in the Age of High-Tech Hos-
tilities, in USE AND MISUSE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 73, 77 (Elena Carpanelli & Nicole Lazzerini eds., 
2019). 
67. AP I, supra 32, art. 51(5)(b). 
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Masahiro Kurosaki writes extensively on the application of proportion-
ality to autonomous weapons systems. He argues that the principle of pro-
portionality applies to autonomous weapons systems and would equally ap-
ply to “computer-centered” systems.68 
 
The principle of proportionality in modern LOAC has developed through 
the “reasonable military commander” standard. However, it is not intrinsi-
cally tied to, or at least not being limited to, the judgment of military com-
manders. It could be subject to adaptation in its application to a given cir-
cumstance by way of legal standards reflecting the sophisticated character-
istics of fully AWS [autonomous weapons systems].69 
 
As Kurosaki notes, there is no legal limitation on having an autonomous 
weapon system apply the principle of proportionality in selecting and engag-
ing targets, assuming it could adequately apply the rule. In an interesting twist 
of argument, Kurosaki further asserts that the Martens Clause—a principle 
of law often used by opponents of autonomous weapons systems70—actually 
supports the use of autonomous weapons, particularly if it could limit the 
impacts on civilians.  
 
[I]t should be recalled that, as the Martens Clause enunciates, the humani-
tarian purpose of LOAC consists in protecting “the inhabitants and bellig-
erents,” no more and no less. The ICTY similarly opined that “[t]he basic 
obligation to spare civilians and civilian objects as much as possible must 
guide the attacking party when considering the proportionality of an at-
tack.”71 
 
The content of the proportionality rule is not disputed with respect to au-
tonomous weapons systems. Rather, the question is whether such systems 
can apply the rule. As mentioned above, it is unclear now what technological 
advancements might allow. What is clear is that any State intending to field 
an autonomous weapons system that selects and engages targets must meet 
the LOAC requirement of applying the rule of proportionality as part of the 
precautions in the attack. 
                                                                                                                      
68. Kurosaki, supra note 3. 
69. Id. 
70. Rob Sparrow, Ethics as a Source of Law: The Martens Clause and Autonomous Weapons, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (Aug. 15, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-pol-
icy/2017/11/14/ethics-source-law-martens-clause-autonomous-weapons/. 
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In the context of the LOAC, cyber tools are rarely used and there is no 
public record of fully autonomous cyber tools being used. However, the 
principle of proportionality applies to both cyber tools utilized under the 
direct control of humans, as advocated in Tallinn Manual 2.072 and by others,73 
and to autonomous cyber capabilities. 
 
5. “An Attack Shall Be Canceled or Suspended” 
 
Article 57(2)(b) requires the attacker cancel or suspend a planned attack 
when the proportionality calculus changes such that the attack would violate 
the LOAC. Certainly, there are some attacks that, once triggered, cannot be 
canceled or suspended (for example, the launching of a missile or the shoot-
ing of a field cannon). Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre write: 
 
[H]umans have been employing weapons where they lack perfect, real-time 
situational awareness of the target area since at least the invention of the 
catapult” and “the essence of a projectile weapon, since the first time a 
human hurled a rock in anger, is the inability to suspend and abort the 
attack after launch.74 
 
Until the point that the attack is actually launched, the targeter must continue 
to apply the LOAC and cancel or suspend any attack that, due to a change 
in circumstances, becomes unlawful. 
All autonomous weapons systems, including autonomous cyber systems, 
must have the capacity to cancel or suspend an attack based on either evi-
dence provided externally or on evidence developed internally. Tallinn Man-
ual 2.0 illustrates this point with the following example: 
 
For example, assume that a cyber attack is planned and all preparations are 
completed, including mapping the network and determining the nature of 
the target system. The attackers are awaiting authorisation by the approving 
authority. Assume further that an operator is continuously monitoring the 
network. Any material changes in the cyber environment of the proposed 
target must be relayed to the commander and other relevant personnel as 
soon as possible.75 
                                                                                                                      
72. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 36, r. 117, at 481. 
73. Jensen, supra note 35, at 204–09. 
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This is at least in part a design requirement that would be reviewed and tested 
as part of the weapons review process. While a legal requirement with which 
States must comply, there is nothing inherent in the construction of auton-
omous weapons that would prevent them from complying with this rule. 
 
C. Article 57(3) – “When a Choice Is Possible between Several Military Objectives” 
 
The last provision of Article 57 that is likely to impact the deployment of 
autonomous weapons systems, including autonomous cyber systems, is Ar-
ticle 57(3), which states: “When a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be se-
lected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least 
danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.”76 
Two aspects of this provision deserve consideration here. First, as this 
type of a decision would be one that inherently requires judgment, any au-
tonomous weapon system would have to be capable of correctly making de-
cisions that comply with law and policy. For autonomous weapons, assessing 
this capability would likely need to be a part of the weapons review process. 
Second, the legal requirements of this provision strongly argue for the 
presence of autonomous weapons systems on the battlefield, and the use of 
autonomous systems more generally. As Ashley Deeks states: 
 
One reason for the military’s attraction to AI is that it can help manage 
doubt. Every day, especially on the urban battlefield, militaries confront 
questions about what they are seeing: is that person holding a video camera 
or a rocket launcher? Why is there very little pedestrian traffic in the market 
today? Is the person I just detained likely to endanger our forces if released? 
Will a strike on that warehouse using a joint direct attack munition produce 
excessive collateral damage? Each of these questions requires decision-
making in the face of uncertainty. AI tools can help categorize objects, 
identify anomalies, and make predictions up to a particular confidence 
level. These algorithms will be especially useful if they produce recommen-
dations that are sensitive to the precise questions that LOAC requires mil-
itaries to answer.77 
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Autonomous systems are systems that utilize ongoing machine learning 
and artificial intelligence. Therefore, the ability of such systems to accurately 
assess data concerning a wide variety of battlefield questions will continually 
increase. The interconnection of sensors, data processors, and algorithmic 
assessments will assuredly enhance the battlefield commander’s ability to 
gather, assess, and exploit intelligence. 
The same holds true when assisting commanders in surveying which 
targets are the least dangerous to civilians. Furthermore, the structural sur-
vivability of non-cyber autonomous systems78 increases the ability to loiter 
and gather intelligence—thereby allowing for more comprehensive and 
thoughtful determinations about selecting and engaging targets. As Charles 
Trumbull states: 
 
Advances in robotics and AI will lead to weapons with far greater endur-
ance than humans. . . . Machines “do not get tired, frightened, bored, or 
angry.” They do not suffer the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder or 
seek revenge after witnessing their fellow soldiers killed in action. Accord-
ingly, autonomous weapons are not susceptible to the human frailties that 
often lead to war crimes.79 
 
To the extent that autonomous weapons live up to these expectations, they 
may prove to be a significant aid in complying with Article 57(3). 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As the analysis above indicates, the requirement to take precautions in attack 
does not present an unassailable legal impediment to the research, develop-
                                                                                                                      
78. See ANDREW FEICKERT, JENNIFER K. ELSEA, LAWRENCE KAPP & LAURIE A. HAR-
RIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45392, U.S. GROUND FORCES ROBOTICS AND AUTONO-
MOUS SYSTEMS (RAS) AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI): CONSIDERATIONS FOR CON-
GRESS 34 (2018) (“[P]roponents of such systems argue that human emotions—fear, anger, 
and the instinct for self-preservation—may lead to adverse consequences on the battlefield. 
Robots, they posit, may not be subject to human errors or unlawful behavior induced by 
human emotions.”). 
79. Charles P. Trumbull IV, Autonomous Weapons: How Existing Law Can Regulate Future 
Weapons, 34 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 533, 545–46 (2020) (citations omitted). 
See also Kurosaki, supra note 3 (“LOAC cannot go so far as to strictly demand human soldiers 
to protect civilians at the sacrifice of their own lives. Machines, however, may be exposed 
to the risk of destruction, hereby creating more opportunities for saving innocent civil-
ians.”). 
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ment, or employment of autonomous weapons systems, including autono-
mous cyber systems, provided such systems are subject to a rigorous weap-
ons review. Furthermore, because Article 57 of Additional Protocol I ap-
plies, without prejudice, to all who plan or decide to attack, autonomous 
weapons remain within the confines of the LOAC requirements. Therefore, 
with rigorous weapons review processes in place that continually examine 
the autonomous system’s continued “learning,” and absent any legal preclu-
sion to compliant systems, proposed autonomous weapons bans are unlikely 
to be successful—especially considering the present success of autonomous 
weapons already in use. 
 
